A Promise of Paradox: Part 1

The Secular Model: A Construct Under Question

A few centuries later since the perception of the ideals, and it’s shining record of promoting relative stability in modern European nations, many regard the liberal-secular model of democracy as one of the presumed defaults for a developed culture in the eyes of the world.

This is also the supposed model that the Nehruvian ‘idea of India’ envisages with great claims of merit. The major common ideals and postulates include the separation of the ‘secular’ and the ‘religious’, religious ‘tolerance’. The state exercises power on matters supposed secular and the religious ones are left to the citizens’ private lives, with freedoms of speech, expression, faith etc. A lot can be written about the features, yet we limit the scope here to give more space to the problems that it faces.

Generally, the circumstances that pose challenges, are attributed to external agents incompatible with the system. Take Islamism in western democracies for example; it is perceived that the growing polarization among migrant Muslims in western democracies and the consequences of it- riots, arson and communal tension, along with the disruption of the ‘peaceful’ and ‘tolerant’ modes of their lives, is an external threat that paralyses the system and gets away with otherwise unacceptable acts. A case, however, can be made, that this tension and paralysis of the model that is supposed to ensure religious peace, is in fact, a symptom of underlying structural flaws in the same which are overlooked in most analytical studies, by almost all side in the matter.

Similar problems arise in India, where the state mandates certain Hindu practices as ‘core’ and certain as not, the ‘secular’ state controlling Hindu temples, vague policies regarding conversions, funding religious institutions, selective laws based on communal and caste lines etc., thus raising questions about the validity itself of secularist model in this cultural context.

As we move to a world that shows signs of growing multipolar systems- the yet limited but undeniably significant rise of China and India as prominent powers etc., the one-size-fits-all approach of western universalist ideas faces a concrete challenge. We can see a cultural encounter taking place here, which is a welcome sight as both might benefit from synthesis. Yet there is a catch. The playground is ‘skewed’ against the non-European traditions.

It is not difficult to realize why- since past couple of centuries, the literature concerned with the intellectual, social and cultural perspectives on these traditions comes primarily from European eyes. It must be noted here that the flaw we are pointing towards is not the European authorship; but the epistemological and metaphysical bias that is present as the European mind tries to make sense of the alien culture in question. The picture we get there is not an empirical description of the state of the culture but it’s experience of the European observer. This means that while valuable in certain regards, this perspective serves poorly as a platform for even discourse.

Separation and Freedom

Secular thought comes in plenty of variations. The common factor among all is the principle of separation of the state and religion. It suggests that the realm of influence and coercive power be divided into two spheres:

1. The ‘secular’ (public) sphere which is governed by the state, adherents of all religions are treated equally; and

2. The ‘religious’ (private) sphere where the citizens are free to adhere to their own conceptions of a good life without any meddling by the state.

Another crucial principle is the guarantee of freedom of conscience for all citizens, that is, freedom to hold and practice their religious beliefs. The model demands non-establishment of state religion, in spirit of dissociating state with religious affairs. Equality, tolerance and mutual respect is supposed to be promoted among adherents of all religions.

The model has seen impressive success in ensuring social cohesion in western societies by limiting the otherwise widespread sectarian disputes. The principle of division of powers between the Church and the state has proved useful in limiting the dominance of religious institutions in political affairs and vice-versa, thus resulting in a relatively neutral environment in the public sphere.

Thus we can conclusively say that this model has contributed to a remarkable achievement of minimizing theocratic conflict, championing the ideas of individual freedoms and equality before law in European societies.

In the past decades, this model has seen widespread acceptance in non-Western societies. Even in the western world itself, we have seen the emergence of new communities that do not share the same worldview. The fissures and conflicts arising out of this can be analyzed and explained when we view the ideals of Secularism with these cultures’ own lenses. Before that, I try to explore a deeper, structural issue- “the puzzle of the two spheres”, as Jacob Roover calls it.

Where Do We Draw The Line?

As we earlier, in a secular model of state, “citizens confine their substantive conceptions of the good to their private lives, whereas the political community is governed in terms of a formal conception of justice.” One begins to ask what is this conception of justice and how is it arrived upon? Well, we seem to have no definitive answer for this.

The two most prominent tendencies through which secularism is expressed in western nations, are:

1. A strict, actively restricting and aggressively limiting anti-religion approach, that includes banning expressions of religion in public spaces. Religious activities and symbols are deemed to be undermining rational governance and hence restricted, limited and banned, depending upon the legal and cultural implications. For example, the Lacite in France

2. A liberal, pluralist and accommodating passive approach where the state ensures freedom of religion for all while checking the dominance of any specific religion. Cohesiveness is sought by relying on tolerance and mutual respect.

In both of these however, we encounter a variety of conceptual problems. How is the distinction made? On what basis do we mark the limits of toleration? Asks Roover, “When does the sphere of freedom end and coercion begin?”

When the conception of good is limited to private life (while the larger society being governed by a pluralistic consensus of justice), how can it adhere to the core secularist of impartiality and non-interference?

To quote Roover again,

“[…] they do not conceive of themselves as ‘unencumbered selves’ or ‘autonomous individuals’ but as members of a community sharing basic goals and values. These cannot be confined to the private sphere but should be taken into account in public political institutions. Besides, the liberal conception of the person does impose a substantive value: it compels citizens to become autonomous individuals, disposing of their commitment to community”

Along with this evident self-contradiction, we encounter another structural issue- the said ‘conception of justice’ that is supposed to be the pluralist bridge that fills the gap between respective conceptions of the communities (and thus ensure cohesion among themselves and impartiality from the state), is practically impossible to arrive upon because cultures around the world do not possess any standard shared secular criteria to delimit the realms of the secular and religious in a neutral manner.

Thus we arrive at the core of this issue: what is religious and what is secular?

The existence of these two separate realms of life is taken as a given fact by the liberal intelligentsia, but it lacks concrete formulation.

The first and obvious demarcation device suggested is the judiciary. It is expected that judges can effectively interpret and formulate the boundaries between the two spheres. However, this problematic on two fronts:

1. When judges (i.e. the judicial arm of the state) are given the task of formulating the distinction between the religious and the secular, they cannot do so, without engaging in theological debates and subscribing to certain interpretations of certain religious doctrines. This defeats the core purpose of secularism itself- the state having no business in religious affairs.

2. They possess their own metaphysical understanding which bars them from being capable of neutral judgement. In the words of Roover, “Liberal states and courts are expected to be neutral towards all religions in their judgment as to what counts as religion. Yet, when they ban certain practices from the public sphere because these are ‘religious’, or determine that some practices are not ‘religious’ and do not fall under the scope of religious freedom, the failure to be religiously neutral appears inevitable. No state or court possesses an impartial scientific conception of religion; there are no shared secular criteria that enable one to identify and delimit the sphere of religion in a manner neutral to all religions. Consequently, judges and other secular authorities are bound to smuggle in some metaphysical or theological conception of religion. That is, a specific religious language becomes the meta-language to discuss and decide on matters of religion in courts of law and serves as the standard to reject certain practices as not ‘truly’ religious. This calls into question the very claim to religious neutrality and secularity at the heart of the liberal model.”

One might argue that courts don't need to create a scientific definition of religion. Instead, they interpret the common societal understanding of what religion encompasses by reflecting the general consensus within society. Their decisions should reflect this prevailing view as best as they can while reasonable interpretations based on this understanding.

But basing the definition of religion on societal views creates a paradox. The majority religion's historical dominance shapes these views, potentially excluding minority practices from religious freedom. This outcome directly contradicts the liberal model's aim to safeguard minorities and perpetuates the tyranny of the majority, the very thing it is meant to prevent.

Another example of the interwoven cultural-social-legal issues can be understood through the Lautsi Case. The case centered on an Italian mother's objection to crucifixes in her children's state school classrooms, arguing a violation of secularism and her educational rights. While Italian courts initially sided with the presence of crucifixes, the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) initially ruled in 2009 that this constituted a violation of the right to education and freedom of thought and religion, deeming the crucifix an intrusive religious symbol. However, this decision was appealed, and in 2011, the ECtHR Grand Chamber reversed the earlier ruling. The Grand Chamber concluded that the presence of crucifixes did not violate the European Convention on Human Rights, finding no evidence of negative impact or indoctrination on students. The Court highlighted the principle of subsidiarity, granting member states a margin of appreciation in cultural and traditional matters. This case brings to the surface the paradox of a secular court of law deciding on the religiosity of a symbol.

Roover summarises it succinctly:

“This reveals the absurdity of the problem: it is impossible for states to determine from a neutral perspective when some object is a religious symbol. This is the case because there are no secular criteria to decide on the religiosity of symbols. Only specific religious teachings can transform objects into religious symbols.”

We look at the Hindu view of this matter:

“This approach means that the world is a symbol, an image, a manifestation of a hidden Godhead. By worshipping any chosen symbol, we worship the same divinity. In its more practical aspect, the approach stands for religious tolerance. It says that the difference of symbols is unreal; that they do not call for all the slaughter and persecution that have been perpetrated in their name by certain narrow- based religions.” (Ram Swarup)

Thus, we can conclude that the liberal-secular state is simply incompetent in administering traditions that do not adhere to same value systems and structures as its parent one (ante tradition). Then there are conceptual issues, like who decides what is religious and what is secular? It is an obvious fact that traditions around the world do not share a common, secular, shared, faith criteria that can help in demarcating the two territories. Having the ‘judges’ decide this seems like a solution simple enough; yet we can be sure that the individual will carry a certain metaphysical bias, earned from his own lived experience. This violates the core promise- that of neutrality and impartiality in matters religious from the secular state.

Another proposed way of delimiting secular and religious matters is using the Harm Principle. Simply put, it is the idea that individuals should be free to do as they wish, as long as their actions do not cause harm to others. This means that the realm of the state’s coercive authority is the self-protection of the individual and prevention of harm to others. Therefore, we are supposed to model the scope of toleration under the aegis of ensuring that communities do not cause any kind of harm to each other. The sphere of freedom ends where harm to others begins.

Like other arguments, this sounds well but falls flat when we exert the discourse to determine what exactly constitutes harm. Physical harm is the obvious starting point, but can slavery be called ‘harmless’ if the victim slaves are ‘treated well’? Moreover, as Roover writes,

“once we go beyond physical harm, the ambiguity of the harm principle surfaces. This problem of indeterminacy threatens the harm principle since no viable criteria exist to determine when our conduct is harmful to others.”

While it may be quite useful in specific cases, apparently the harm principle cannot serve as a concrete basis for determining the scope of separation between religious and secular affairs.

Here again, the Hindu outlook on people from other communities is a misfit with no defined relation to the secular doctrine:

“[…] people have different natures, different dispositions, and different degrees of preparedness; that their starting-points are different, their capacities, talents and desires are different. Therefore, do not look for one mode and one medium in people’s worship. Make allowance for their variety and respect that variety. This attitude means that different peoples and different races have their own presiding genius, their own talents and their own svadharma. They worship the best when they worship through their svadharma. Therefore, we should imbibe an attitude of mind which believes that those who are not with us are not against us; that those alone are truly with us who are truly with themselves. We should not play the big brother in relation to others.” (Ram Swarup)

“They [Hindus] claim no exclusive revelation. The truths they speak are universal. They are open to all who have the necessary sincerity and seeking and who put in the necessary effort. They do not ask you to believe; they ask you to investigate, to find out. But if you are not interested or do not care, it is up to you. There is no force, no threats, no sales talk.” (Ram Swarup)

The other supposed institutional safeguards that preserve the religious-secular split, like secular education system, public sphere neutrality, religion neutral laws, restrictions on public funding, the non-endorsement principle etc. suffer from the above mentioned issues in varying degrees.

Thus, we can clearly see that there is great ambiguity and absurdness surrounding the religious-secular dichotomy.

Without a concise and neutral understanding of what constitutes ‘religion’, establishing the limits of the "spiritual" to delineate the limits of the "political" is a tedious, repetitive and aimless task. As stated, the absence of universally shared secular criteria to define and separate the religious and secular spheres poses a fundamental problem for the liberal model's aspiration of state neutrality. In fact, from a certain point of view, the very act of seeking a constrained definition of ‘religion’ or the ‘religious’ might also be viewed as a secular construct in itself!

For instance, the Western understanding of "religion" as focusing on rituals and affirming dogmatic beliefs might not align with broader concepts like "Dharma" of Hinduism, which encompasses ethics and the natural order, along with broad communal and metaphysical implications.

Says Ram Swarup:

“Religion is not an opiate of the people; on the contrary, it represents a very important dimension of life and is one of the noblest expressions of the spirit. Religion brings a fulfilment for which there is no other substitute. To suppress religion is to maim the life of a people.”

Deconstructing A Construct

All these doubts lead us to the final question: does this religious-secular dichotomy really exist? Or is it merely a construct imposed by liberalism, taken as a self-evident truth without second questions, or deliberations over its impacts (especially in non-western societies)?

So far we have seen that “At the normative level, it becomes impossible to separate them in any consistent and consensual manner.” (Roover)

To demonstrate the validity of the supposed dichotomy, one would need to exhibit the inherent presence of these in human life, thus showing that “these two spheres can be retrieved in actual experience. The challenge is to provide a criterion that allows us to identify the two spheres at the empirical level.”

In a 1997 essay, American political scientist Alan Wolfe observes in an essay titled ‘Public and Private in Theory and Practice: Some Implications of an Uncertain Boundary’:

“the distinction between the public and the private … is a slippery one, incapable of being established in a way that accords either with an adequate empirical description of the major institutions of modern society or with satisfactory normative justifications’ and conclude that it concerns ‘a shifting and uncertain boundary’.”

As Roover observes, such remarks of ‘dynamic’ or ‘shifting’ boundaries can be multiplied indefinitely. While it is acceptable to argue that the lines are consistently being negotiated and redrawn, the problem of these two spheres is not about the exact location of boundaries but a concrete conception of at least one of the spheres; either secular or religious.

The criterion we seek, and the one the model’s advocates raise should be capable of identifying the sphere of religion and distinguish it from the secular, or the opposite. At least one of the two should be clearly identifiable.

The problem is that liberal thought, presupposes the validity of this specific demarcation as implicitly accepted rather than explicitly theorized within its core tenets. In simple words, liberal theories assume this distinction is real but can't fully explain it.

Roover begins by quoting these words of Ernst Kantorowicz:

“Political mysticism in particular is exposed to the danger of losing its spell or becoming quite meaningless when taken out of its native surroundings, its time and its space.”

And later concludes, after the liberal failure to demarcate the central lines or define the two foundational spheres that:

“[…] as already discussed, there are no widely shared and generally accessible criteria allowing us to recognise the spheres, let alone demonstrate their existence. So either liberal secularism is a viable political model and it should solve this problem; or the liberal conception of the ‘person’ is a piece of occult anthropology and then we can safely add liberal secularism to the political mysticisms of our time.”

Conclusion

In conclusion, this analysis has illuminated the inherent ambiguity surrounding the conceptual separation of the 'secular' and 'religious' domains. The liberal-secular model, while influential, encounters significant challenges in its aspiration for universal applicability due to the lack of universally shared criteria for demarcating these spheres. This raises critical questions regarding the model's neutrality and its capacity to accommodate diverse cultural and epistemological frameworks. Consequently, the Nehruvian 'idea of India,' with its own unique historical and socio-religious context, presents a compelling case for further examination.

The next part will deal in detail with secularism in pre and post independent India and the complications that have arisen since then. Thanks for reading and subscribe to the CSHC Substack for many more such articles.

Sources:

1. Europe, India and The Limits of Secularism, Jacob De Roover

2. Religious Freedom, Ram Swarup

3. Secularism In India, Sita Ram Goel

4. On The Theories of Secularism and Modernisation, A.K. Saran